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Abstract - Future reduced crew operations or even single 
pilot operations for commercial airline and on-demand mobility 
applications are an active area of research. These changes would 
reduce the human element and thus, threaten the precept that “a 
well-trained and well-qualified pilot is the critical center point of 
aircraft systems safety and an integral safety component of the 
entire commercial aviation system.” NASA recently completed a 
pilot-in-the-loop high fidelity motion simulation study in 
partnership with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
attempting to quantify the pilot’s contribution to flight safety 
during normal flight and in response to aircraft system failures. 
Crew complement was used as the experiment independent 
variable in a between-subjects design. These data show 
significant increases in workload for single pilot operations, 
compared to two-crew, with subjective assessments of safety and 
performance being significantly degraded as well. Nonetheless, 
in all cases, the pilots were able to overcome the failure mode 
effects in all crew configurations. These data reflect current-day 
flight deck equipage and help identify the technologies that may 
improve two-crew operations and/or possibly enable future 
reduced crew and/or single pilot operations. 
Keywords – single pilot operations, reduced crew 
operations, aviation safety, increasingly autonomous systems, 
automation, automation surprise, crew complement. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The crew complement – the number of required crew 
members on-duty on an aircraft flight deck – is established 
by the design of the aircraft and regulated by design and 
operating regulations under which it is flown [ 1 ]. The 
number of crew on-board the aircraft may also be 
augmented because of flight duration and crew duty times. 
Some long-haul flights require three or four pilots on-board 
and the duty time on the flight deck, operating the aircraft, 
is shared to remain within allowable crew duty time limits 
(see Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations, CFR Part 
117).  
The possibility of reduced crew operations (RCO, i.e., 
the reduction in the crew complement required to operate a 
mission) or even single pilot operations (SPO, i.e., 
operations where only a single human pilot is on-board a 
flight when more than one human pilot is required today) 
for commercial airline and on-demand mobility applications 
is an active area of research. Part of the motivation is that 
we are witnessing vast improvements in computational 
power and machine learning that are creating everyday 
autonomous capabilities such as driving. Many envision 
RCO, or even SPO, as a next logical step in aviation 
advancement [ 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ] and often that motivation is 
economic, either by the reduction of costs associated with 
employing human pilots or in terms of finding and training 
enough qualified flight crew for operations. Finally, 
arguments are also made that the human is increasingly 
becoming a bottleneck to efficient airspace operations. 
Machines (i.e., automation) are becoming much more 
capable and many foresee a future where these machines 
can perform the requisite aviation tasking and duties as well 
as if not even better than humans, especially when it is cited 
that more than 60% of aviation accidents include human 
error as a causal factor [6].  
The reality is that the change toward RCO or even SPO 
will require technological innovations and regulatory 
changes. Quantitative evidence will be required to argue 
either the pro or con case, where little if any exists today. 
For instance, often the citation of pilot (human)-error as a 
causal factor in aviation accidents is used to imply that an 
improvement in safety can be gained by eliminating the 
human element on the flight deck. This argument is a 
complete fallacy. It only argues one side of the problem – 
the forensic analysis. There is no data that identifies how 
and how often pilots prevent or avert accidents or incidents 
because these statistics are not kept. Anecdotal evidence, in 
fact, suggests the opposite of the forensic evidence implying 
that crews routinely handle and adapt to ever-present and 
ever-changing operations and system/equipment failures. 
Airline’s Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) data [7, 
8] supports the importance of the human to safety (although 
the data are not publicly released). The Air Line Pilots 
Association argues that “a well-trained and well-qualified 
pilot is the critical center point of aircraft systems safety and 
an integral safety component of the entire commercial 
aviation system.” [9] In the case of Part 121 operations, 
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highly trained and competent pilots (and well-maintained 
equipment and proven operations) achieve a level of safety 
that is estimated to be 10,000 times safer than automobile 
travel and is often cited as the world’s safest mode of travel.  
NASA is conducting research to address the needs of 
future air transportation and airspace operations. Under its 
strategic plan, NASA is conducting research, development, 
test, and evaluation to create “assured autonomy for aviation 
transformation.” The Safe Autonomous Systems Operations 
(SASO) Project is chartered to identify and develop 
autonomous systems capabilities enabling operational 
concepts and complexity that sustain significant growth in 
passengers and cargo beyond the Next Generation Air 
Transportation System (NextGen). The project's goal is to 
seek ways to safely integrate within the National Airspace 
System (NAS) the highest level of autonomy that is 
justifiable, and develop methods for assurance. NASA is 
evaluating the efficacy of autonomy technologies that might 
enable RCO and/or SPO. 
This paper describes a research experiment conducted to 
quantify the human pilot contribution to current-day flight 
operations. This work helped establish “baseline” levels of 
performance and safety with nominal crew configuration as 
well as collect data to assess the performance and safety 
changes for reduced crew and single pilot crew 
complements in a present-day flight deck design. The goal 
is then to identify technology requirements – new 
automation and more appropriately, increasingly 
autonomous systems (IAS) - that might assist future two-
crew operations and potentially enable RCO or SPO. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The certification requirements for the aircraft’s 
minimum crew are defined under regulations such as 14 
CFR Part 25.1523. The minimum flight crew must enable 
safe operation of the kind envisioned and consider the pilot 
workload and the accessibility and ease of operation of 
necessary controls. The basic workload functions to 
consider are: (1) flight path control; (2) collision avoidance; 
(3) navigation; (4) communications; (5) operation and 
monitoring of aircraft engines and systems; and, (6) 
command decisions.  
A. Operational Concepts 
Two conceptually different, but complementary 
operational concepts are considered herein, in addition to 
the current-day two-crew complement: 
a) Reduced Crew Operations (i.e., single pilot cruise): 
 In RCO, two human pilots are on-board the aircraft. 
Two pilots fly, as they normally do so today, during 
high-workload, congested airspace conditions, such as 
surface operations, departure, initial climb-out, 
descent, approach, and landing. However, during the 
cruise phase of flight, only one pilot is actively engaged 
in flying the aircraft. The other pilot is resting or 
possibly napping. (The resting pilot may, in fact, leave 
the cockpit or may be seated in their cockpit seat.) 
Augmentation to the crew complement –additional 
flight pilots/crew, as required today for fatigue 
mitigation and operational necessity - is not used; 
instead, alternating rest cycles for the two pilots are 
employed.  
b) Single Pilot Operations (SPO): 
 The only pilot on-board the aircraft serves as the 
captain and pilot-in-command (PIC), making all 
decisions and performing actions pertaining to 
command of the flight. In the event that assistance is 
needed, a ground operator may be linked to the cockpit 
via digital data-link, video, and/or radio. This 
assistance may also be scheduled or routinely 
employed during high-workload conditions such as 
approach and landing operations. The necessity, extent, 
timing, security, and expertise required of this remote 
assistance is the subject of research.  
Neither of these concepts are particularly new or novel, 
with elements covered by patents (e.g., [10], [11]) or similar 
disclosures [12] as well as significant on-going research 
being conducted under such programs as the DARPA 
ALIAS (Aircrew Labor In-Cockpit Automation System) 
program [13] and the ACROSS (Advanced Cockpit for 
Reduction Of Stress and Workload) program [14].  
In either case, new automation or more aptly, IAS, 
perform or assist in the functions of the crew member who 
is now not actively engaged in the flight. The unique, 
specific challenges for RCO and SPO are described in the 
following. sections It is felt by some that “the greatest 
obstacle to the development of a civil, single pilot aircraft is 
not the technology per se but applying the technology and 
developing the automation and user interfaces.” [3] 
B. Remote Pilot Assistance 
NASA has been conducting research into remote pilot 
assistance, developing various operational paradigms (e.g., 
“Harbor pilot” or “Super Dispatcher”) and most 
importantly, exploring whether a remote pilot can 
effectively complete the tasking and reduce the workload to 
safely enable SPO.  
To date, experiments have demonstrated that “separating 
a two-pilot crew is feasible within the parameters and 
concepts that were designed and tested.” [15] It is assumed 
that part-time or scheduled, periodic support from a ground 
operator is a necessary condition for SPO. Thus, a ground 
operator can handle multiple flights, and if dedicated 
support is necessary, dedicated assistants can be provided. 
This concept raises the question of how a ground operator’s 
lack of initial situation awareness (SA), when called on for 
dedicated assistance, might be an issue. The data shows that, 
with appropriate displays, ground operators were able to 
provide immediate assistance, even if they had minimal SA 
prior to getting a request during en-route scenarios [16]. In 
a test of SPO during approach to landing, no differences in 
pilot error rates were shown comparing the nominal, 
continuous flight operation versus the case where the pilot 
re-entered a flight immediately upon request or after a two 
minute preparation spool-up time [17]. A primary concern 
is the ability (or inability) to know what the other pilot is 
doing [ 18 ]. The design of the ground station, the 
information, and the security and content of the datalink as 
well as the expertise of the ground operator are critical 
issues. In an analogous operational setting, research from 
the time-critical field of emergency medicine suggests that 
many modalities of communication must be adhered to for 
emergency room doctors to quickly and effectively get a 
team of professionals to create effective medical care. This 
research [ 19 ] showed that visual monitoring of team 
members' activities was an important part of team 
coordination and an essential part of team work. 
These studies have not fully investigated the value of 
pilot monitoring [20] for error catching and trapping since 
it is assumed that these functions will be replaced by IAS 
technology.  
C. Pilot Incapacitation or Impairment 
In either SPO or RCO concepts, pilot impairment or 
incapacitation could be catastrophic.  
In-flight medical incapacitation is defined as a condition 
in which a flight crewmember was unable to perform any 
flight duties and impairment as a condition in which a 
crewmember could perform limited flight duties, even 
though performance may have been degraded [ 21 ]. 
Although the data are not definitive [22], ICAO Document 
8984 “Manual of Civil Aviation Medicine” employs a “1% 
rule” where the risk of incapacitation is assumed to be one 
percent per annum or approximately equal to one event in 1 
million flying hours. Research [ 23 ] shows that the 
incapacitation risk is “small under the age of 40, increases 
over the age of 50, and rises steeply over the age of 60.” By 
age 60, the data show an average incapacitation rate of 
approximately 1.2%. Today, the age limit is 65 for Part 121 
operations (as of 2009). In-flight incapacitation events are 
thus predicted to rise with this increase in retirement age, 
but data are not yet available. Impairment can be as 
detrimental as incapacitation during RCO or SPO.  
As such, the measurement of the pilot’s psycho-
physiological state and identification of adverse human 
physical and cognitive impairment will be critical 
technology for RCO/SPO. The development of psycho-
physiological measures and state identification technologies 
is on-going, as are appropriate counter-measures [24] to 
meet the challenges of: 
a) Developing sensor suites with appropriate data 
fusion methods since the results to date suggest that 
multiple sensor modalities are needed for most 
classifications; 
b) Creating measurement and identification 
technologies that are robust and reliable enough to 
match the appropriate performance standards of 
today’s on-board avionics systems (i.e., FAA 
Advisory Circular AC 25-1309); 
c) Meeting these technology goals while 
simultaneously not over-encumbering the pilot, 
interfering with their operations on the flight deck, 
or violating privacy concerns. 
This work will also have to include the eventual 
development of standards for pilot selection and fitness for 
duty as well as more robust methods for fatigue monitoring 
and counter-measures.  
D. Fatigue 
The adoption of RCO/SPO may most directly affect the 
issues of pilot fatigue and the need for attention 
management.  
Under the RCO concept, a regimented period of 
‘controlled rest’ is envisioned as a fatigue counter-measure 
and critical to the economic viability of the concept. 
Research supports the contention that “napping is the most 
effective non-pharmacological technique for restoring 
alertness.” [25] But today, the FAA authorizes in-flight naps 
for flight crew only if there is an augmented complement so 
that two pilots are actively engaged on the flight deck while 
the augmenting crewmembers are resting. A number of 
foreign air carriers do authorize in-seat cockpit naps. In 
contrast, SPO implies isolation for the single pilot 
necessitating, at times, an active means of engagement to 
prevent boredom and sleep. 
Although beneficial for combating fatigue, cockpit 
napping can have adverse effects because of sleep inertia 
and other factors [26] [27]. Canadian Aviation Regulations 
(CAR), described in CAR 2014-1, Part VII - Commercial 
Air Services, Section 720.23, describe some of the 
challenges to effectively employ controlled rest, including: 
 Pre-flight briefing - planned rest periods can 
maximize the sleep opportunity and better manage 
their alertness. 
 Pre-rest - the flight crew must prepare for the transfer 
of duties. 
 Rest periods – rest periods should be limited to a 
maximum of 45 minutes to avoid sleep inertia when 
the flight crew member is awakened. Rest periods 
shall occur only during the cruise phase of the flight 
and shall be completed at least 30 minutes before 
planned top of descent, workload permitting; 
 Post-rest - Unless required due to an abnormal or 
emergency situation, at least 15 minutes without any 
flight duties should be provided to the awakened flight 
crew member to allow sufficient time to become fully 
awake before resuming normal duties; and (b) an 
operational briefing shall be given to the awakened 
flight crew member. 
The methods and processes for removing and re-
engaging flight crews, in person or remotely, is critical to 
maintaining effective teaming, situation awareness, and 
flight crew performance throughout the flight.  
E. Increasingly Autonomous Systems  
New automation or more aptly, IAS, must perform or 
assist in the performance of functions that the second pilot 
in RCO/SPO flight would normally do. This does not 
necessarily mean relegating the RCO or SPO pilot to the 
pilot-monitoring role; the roles and functions for IAS must 
be tailored to the operation and the needs of the human. 
Our work involves the research, development, test, and 
evaluation of IAS. IAS are envisioned as intelligent 
machines - hardware and software systems - seamlessly 
integrated with humans, whereby task performance of the 
combined system is significantly greater than the individual 
components. IAS utilize machine learning concepts to 
perform functions without explicitly being programmed. 
These systems have the ability to modify their behavior in 
response to their external environment and conditions. 
Nevertheless, these IAS are also designed using human-
autonomy and automation interaction teaming principals, 
without the active and latent failings prevalent in many of 
today’s automated cockpits.  
IAS, if properly designed, can replicate and in fact 
should, enhance safety and reliability [28] (e.g., provide the 
ability to adapt to changing patterns and preferences; remain 
vigilant at all times; tailor automation actions to specific 
circumstances/add flexibility; increase situation awareness 
by context-sensitive information; monitor human actions 
and alert or intervene to prevent errors; improve 
automation’s ability to react quickly to avoid critical 
situations). By creating human-autonomy teaming and 
associated technologies, the unique abilities of intelligent 
machines and humans are leveraged to create levels of 
safety and performance above and beyond that provided by 
either one singularly. Such a system may be especially 
suited during off-nominal events or in conditions where less 
experienced or non-expert operators are involved. 
III. BASELINE STUDY  
To kick-off this research toward improving current-day 
two-crew operations, and potentially enabling SPO/RCO by 
application of IAS, a baseline study was conducted. The 
goal was to evaluate and quantify the human pilot’s 
contribution to flight safety during normal flight and in 
response to aircraft system failures.  
A pilot-in-the-loop flight simulation study was 
performed by the NASA Langley Research Center in 
partnership with the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA). To quantify the human’s contribution, crew 
complement was used as the experiment independent 
variable, as follows: 
• Nominal two-crew - the Captain (CP) and First Officer 
(FO) were seated in the left and right seats, 
respectively. 
• Reduced Crew Operation (RCO) - the CP and FO were 
seated in the left and right seats, respectively, as usual. 
One pilot was designated as the resting pilot. This pilot 
remained seated in their seat but, when designated for 
rest, they donned a visual/audio restriction device to be 
isolated from the sights and sounds of the flight. The 
resting pilot returned to active flying duties only after 
being requested by the pilot-flying, but with 
experimental constraints imposed to control their 
reentry to flying duties.  
• Single Pilot Operations (SPO) - the CP or FO was 
seated in the left seat and the other pilot was not in the 
simulator. Although this is not the usual seat for the FO, 
this methodology was planned because the left seat has 
access to all normally required equipage (e.g., the tiller) 
as would be expected for an aircraft designed for SPO. 
Further, pilots are required to fly from the left seat to 
obtain their aircraft type rating so all pilots have trained 
in the left seat. 
The different crew complement conditions were flown 
in a between-subjects experiment during both nominal and 
six non-normal scenarios of various severity.  
Although NASA’s interest is in future technologies, as a 
baseline study, new technologies were not introduced. The 
test utilized a present-day flight deck design to quantify the 
current status of flight deck and airspace operations. These 
data are fundamental to and critical for the design and 
development of future IAS that can better support the 
human in the cockpit.  
A brief overview of the experiment is provided in the 
following with references to other publications as they 
contain more detailed analysis of the test methods and 
specific scenario results. This paper focuses on the overall 
assessment of dual-crew versus RCO or SPO and the 
technology requirements derived from these data for 
increasingly autonomous systems that might assist future 
two-crew operations and eventually possibly enable 
reduced crew or single pilot operations. 
IV. EXPERIMENT 
A. Participants 
Thirty-six pilots (18 crews), representing 5 major US 
airlines, participated in this experiment. Each pilot held an 
Airline Transport Pilot rating and was current in the B737-
800 aircraft as either CP or FO. Crews were paired from the 
same employer to minimize inter-crew conflicts in Standard 
Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Crew Resource 
Management (CRM) procedures or training. All participants 
were male.  
B. Apparatus 
The research was conducted using the B737-800 
simulator operated by the FAA AFS-440 at Oklahoma City, 
OK. The simulator, although a Level D approved training 
device, is also fitted with experimental controls, 
modifications, and recording capability to support AFS-
440’s research mission.  
The test was set-up to replicate a normal airline 
operation and mimic the ‘real-world’ to the best of our 
ability. An air carrier flight from Denver (KDEN) to 
Albuquerque (KABQ) was used. Dispatch paperwork for 
the flight was developed and used by the crews. A key 
element of the test was a live controller and various pseudo-
pilots tied into the simulation radio to emulate Air Traffic 
Control (ATC) for realism and to maintain realistic pilot 
workload levels.  
C. Independent Variables 
The independent variables were crew complement and 
scenario. Three (3) crew conditions as described above were 
used: nominal two-crew, RCO, and SPO in addition to six 
non-normal scenarios. 
D. Nominal Operations  
The crews were instructed to use their normal company 
SOPs, their Quick Reference Handbooks (QRH), charts, 
and checklist procedures for the entire test, including any 
company dispatch calls and cabin crew communications as 
SOP. After the crews had reviewed the paperwork and 
discussed amongst themselves the flight and flight conduct, 
the crew manned the aircraft (simulator), did a quick 
familiarization check and reviewed the simulator safety 
briefing. The crews were instructed to fly the (simulator) 
flight as if it were a normal revenue flight for their airline. 
Of particular note, the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) was 
out-of-service for the flight. (The APU is not a minimum 
equipage list item.) 
The crew flew an entire “nominal” flight from KDEN to 
KABQ following the planned route of flight as their first 
event in the test. The nominal flight served as a baseline for 
‘normal’ airline operations (i.e., nominal data) and also 
helped to garner familiarity for the two-person crew 
interaction. This nominal flight was 1 hour 25 minutes of 
flight time. 
Six (6) nominal RCO flights were also conducted with 
the CP as the resting pilot during the cruise leg of the flight 
and 18 pilots flew nominal SPO runs from Top-of-Descent 
(TOD) to KABQ.  
E. Scenario Categories 
Six (6) non-normal experimental scenarios were 
designed. The scenarios modulated workload and 
automation issues (e.g., by the availability of the autopilot 
after the failure) and flight crew awareness and monitoring 
during the normal/non-normal operation. 
The experimental scenarios started at either the Top-of-
Climb (TOC) or approximately 15 minutes prior to the TOD 
along the nominal flight plan. The simulation was reset to 
these initial conditions and the crew/pilot were briefed on 
the starting position prior to going to “operate.” These two 
conditions were used for test expediency. The crews were 
briefed that the flight to this point was nominal. All flights 
were flown to completion (i.e., landing).  
The test matrix is shown in Table 1 with the number of 
populated cells (N) defined with the 18 crews: 
The six non-normal scenarios have all occurred in 
revenue service (although, obviously, the exact 
circumstances are different) and with the 3 crew 
configurations, stressed all of the pilot workload factors, to 
various degrees, outlined in Appendix D of 14 CFR Part 25, 
including: (1) The accessibility, ease, and simplicity of all 
necessary controls (e.g., the hydraulic leak required manual 
gear extension); 2) The accessibility and conspicuity of all 
necessary instruments and failure warning devices. (e.g., the 
overspeed clacker during the unreliable airspeed failure is 
an extremely loud and intrusive alarm); 3) The number, 
urgency, and complexity of operating procedures (e.g., the 
generator failure stressed systems knowledge); (4) The 
degree and duration of concentrated mental and physical 
effort involved in normal operation and in diagnosing and 
coping with malfunctions and emergencies; 5) The extent of 
required monitoring of the systems; 6) The degree of 
automation provided (e.g., the rudder trim runaway required 
significant manual control activity); 7) The communications 
and navigation workload (e.g., single pilot operations for the 
C category failures are significantly taxing since the 
autopilot is not available); and, 8) the possibility of 
increased workload associated with any emergency that 
may lead to other emergencies (e.g., the loss of both 
generators was a time critical emergency that could lead to 
a complete loss of electrical power). 
Post-test, pilots were given a questionnaire and 
additional ratings and comments were taken as described in 
the following. 
V. RESULTS 
This paper provides an evaluation of crew configuration 
influence across the entire array of normal and non-normal 
operations using a current-day flight deck configuration 
during two-crew, reduced crew, and single pilot operations. 
Specific review of each non-normal and its specific effects 
and influences are contained in [29, 30, 31, 32, 33]. 
A. Objective Performance Data  
The objective performance data are essentially unique 
for each of the non-normal events because of the vast array 
of failure conditions and effects. These data, therefore, are 
not generalizable (see each of the individual papers). There 
are some observations that are generally indicated: 
 Checklist usage is more consistent and accurate in 
two-crew vs. RCO or SPO operations. In RCO, the 
start of the checklist was often delayed until the 
resting pilot came back to flying duties. The RCO 
condition was also occasionally problematic since 
the flying pilot may or may not have started the 
appropriate checklists. If the crew did not do a 
thorough ‘return-to-duty’ briefing, the returning pilot 
may have assumed that the checklists were done, 
when in fact, they were not. A specific “pre-rest” 
briefing checklist was imposed in the experiment but 
a “return to duty” briefing was not. This was left to 
the crews and is similar to current long-haul flights 
that use augmented crews. In SPO, significant task 
shedding occurred and checklist usage was often 
sacrificed. The difficulty of hand-flying and trouble-
shooting by a single pilot created complications in 
getting to the checklist and it encouraged 
troubleshooting outside of the checklist. 
 Flight path performance was better in two-crew than 
SPO or RCO. Two pilots provided for a pilot 
monitoring. Two-crew operations provided four 
hands, four eyes, and two brains to monitor and work 
the problem(s). Two pilots provided for workload 
sharing, especially in the rudder trim runaway non-
normal where the physical workload to control the 
vehicle was significant. Two pilots provided a larger 
wealth of experience from which to draw from such 
as adapting to unique flying techniques (using 
asymmetric thrust to help balance fuel load or rudder 
trim), knowing nearby available, suitable, but 
underused airports (Grand Junction, CO), or 
understanding secondary or compounding failure 
effects that are not checklist items (loss of generators 
will cause pressurization effects). 
 To date, we have not quantified the pilot errors; that 
work is on-going. In general, more errors were 
committed in SPO than RCO, but errors were 
committed in all crew conditions.  Errors of omission 
and commission were observed. 
B. Pilot Workload – Nominal Flight  
Observations from the test suggest that the primary 
determinant of safety of flight and the propensity for flight 
crew errors was directly related to pilot workload. When the 
pilot workload exceeded certain limits, the pilots would 
shed tasks and in doing so, errors in execution or omission 
would occur.  
The NASA Task Load Index (TLX) [34] captured a 
subjective rating (0-100) of perceived task load. There are 
six subscales of workload represented in the TLX: mental 
demand, physical demand, temporal demand, performance, 
effort, and frustration. The overall and subscale score results 
of this measure were examined to investigate task load 
variation.  
The Captain’s (CP) workload for the three crew 
configurations, using the average TLX rating across the 6 
components, is shown in Figure 1. The box plot data of 
Figure 1 and in the subsequent figures show the mean value 
by the red line, the 25th and 75th percentile by the extent of 
the box, with the 5% statistical spread from the mean shown 
by the indent. The whiskers show the maximum and 
minimum values up to 1.5 x the interquartile range. Plus 
signs indicate ratings outside of 1.5 x interquartile range.  
Interestingly, the workload for the CPs is reduced in the 
RCO configuration compared to the two-crew configuration 
during nominal flight conditions. These data are anomalous 
as there are two effects in play. First, RCO means the 
Captain had a rest period. Crews noted that the RCO 
concept, where one of the pilots is resting in the cockpit 
(napping), can be an effective fatigue mitigation. This fact 
is resident in these data and it has also been an observation 
supported by other research as previously reviewed.  
 
Table 1. Experimental Test Matrix 
Scenarios  Crew Complement 
Nominal 
Two 
RCO SPO 
 FO Resting CP Resting  
 Nominal 18 3 6 18 
A Unreliable Airspeed 6 3 6 6 
 Engine Fuel Leak 6 3 6 6 
B Reservoir Hydraulic Leak 6 3 6 6 
 Generator Drive Shaft Failure 6 3 6 6 
C Loss of Both Generators 6 3 6 6 
 Rudder Trim Runaway 6 3 6 6 
 Secondly, the experiment design artificially introduced 
biased (higher) workload ratings for the nominal two-crew 
condition. The nominal two-crew was run as the first event 
for the subjects and this run was not repeated. In hindsight, 
the experiment should have used the first run as familiarity 
and thrown the data away. In the first run, the subjects 
naturally have some anxiety, being in a new environment 
and being subjects in a research experiment. As such, their 
self-assessed workload skewed high. 
 
 
Fig 1. CP TLX Workload Rating by Crew Configurations – Nominal Flight 
Workload for the Captain in the SPO condition trends 
much higher than the RCO condition, but not tremendously 
so. The mean rating for nominal SPO was only 37 out of 
100 maximum.  
The data for the FO shows similar trends as the CP but 
to greater extremes (Figure 2). The RCO condition is 
significantly lower in workload than the two-crew 
configuration and the workload in the SPO configuration for 
the FO is significantly higher than RCO and higher than for 
the Captain.  
The same workload anomaly for the two-crew 
configuration for the CPs is reflected in the FOs as well. The 
two-crew workload is anomalously high. In the case of the 
RCO condition, the low workload reflects a nominal flight 
condition - so the FO didn’t have much to do and was single 
pilot only during the cruise phase of flight - and that the 
workload for the descent, approach and landing for the FO 
was less overall workload since the CP was now rested and 
always took the last flight leg. The trend for higher 
workload by the FO during SPO is likely due to a CP’s 
greater experience and familiarity with being responsible 
for the entire operation. Further, by experiment design, we 
put the FO in the left seat; thus, increasing their workload to 
acclimate to a different seat. 
C. Pilot Workload – Non-Normals  
In the presence of non-normals, the workload data from 
the CP and FO became almost identical. The workload data 
across all non-normal scenarios is collapsed across pilots 
and is shown in Figure 3. The data show a statistically 
significant increase in workload for the SPO condition 
compared to the nominal two-crew and RCO configurations 
(which did not statistically differ from each other). The data 
also reflects the wide disparity of non-normals tested, from 
the relatively benign hydraulic leak to the rudder trim 
runaway and dual generator failures which created 
significant physical and temporal workload, respectively. 
The data extremes are shown in the whiskers of the box 
plots. 
 
 
Fig. 2. FO TLX Workload Rating by Crew Configurations – Nominal  
 
Figure 3:  Pilot Workload for Non-Normal Events 
Although the workload data shows that SPO is not 
desirable from a workload standpoint, all crews/pilots were 
able to safety conduct and complete a safe landing. 
Significant task shedding was noted, especially in the case 
of checklists. Errors and procedural omissions were noted, 
although errors and procedural omissions were also noted 
during two-crew and RCO conditions. The TLX physical 
demand data (not shown) is indicative of how the change in 
the crew complement significantly impacts the number of 
switch actions, button presses, control inputs, and other 
ancillary duties which are now the burden of a single pilot; 
these changes significantly increasing the risk of errors on 
the flight deck. 
D. Post-Test Workload Comparison 
A post-test, paired comparison was conducted with the 
subjects for subjective workload assessment of the three 
crew configurations. The post-test comparisons, using the 
Subjective Workload Dominance (SWORD) [ 35 ] test, 
quantified the relative workload across the three crew 
configurations (Two-crew, RCO, SPO) while dealing with 
a non-normal event. The CP and FO independently 
completed the SWORD comparisons. For these 
comparisons, workload was defined as “the integrated 
physical and mental effort to perform the assigned task.” 
Independent Analysis-of-Variance (ANOVA) revealed 
crew configuration was significant for CP SWORD ratings 
(F(2,51)=116.39, p<0.0001) and FO SWORD ratings 
(F(2,51)=93.51, p<0.0001). Post-hoc tests (SNK using 
=0.05) showed the same three unique subsets for the CP 
and FO SWORD ratings: 1) Two-crew (lowest workload), 
2) RCO, and 3) SPO.   
These data confirmed that crew complement 
significantly influenced pilot workload. 
E. Crew Resource Management (CRM) 
The effect of RCO on Crew Resource Management was 
subjectively self-rated by the CP and FO using a 7 point 
Likert scale from strongly agree (1) to strongly disagree (7) 
in response to five (5) questions related to the indices of 
CRM (i.e., from AC120-51E, Section 14(a)), focused on: a) 
communication; b) decision-making; c) team-building: d) 
workload maintenance; and, e) SA. These data were 
collected following the completion of the two-crew and 
RCO evaluations.  
These subjective data show no significant differences in 
ratings between the CP and FO or between the two-crew and 
RCO operation. The crews did not feel that RCO impacted 
CRM. 
To quantify the “reengagement” by the resting pilot, the 
pilots were asked two questions using a seven-point Likert-
type scale to gauge the timing and effectiveness of the 
resting pilot re-engagement back into the simulation. The 
first question was whether the time the resting pilot re-
entered the flight was “too early” (rating of 1) vs. “too late” 
(a rating of 7) with a rating of 4 being “just right.” The 
second question asked whether the reengagement was 
“completely ineffective” (rating of 1) versus “completely 
effective” (rating of 7) and a rating of 4 (“neutral”). These 
data are shown in Figure 4 and 5.  
The data in Figure 4 show that the reengagement by the 
CPs was sometimes felt to be too late even in the nominal 
case, whereas the FO thought the time was fine in nominal 
flight conditions. (We could not follow the CAR 
recommendations due to flight time limitations for our 
experimental scenarios; the resting pilot, CP, was brought 
back to duty just prior to TOD.) These responses might 
suggest that the CPs experienced some elements of 
rest/fatigue or sleep inertia and wanted to return to duties 
earlier to be more awake and aware. Both pilots agreed that 
it was generally later than desired during non-normal 
events, but not universally so. (One CP, in fact, rated the 
time as “too early.” In this case, this rating was given 
because he was “engaged” too early in returning to duty. He 
felt that he needed to come up to speed with the situation 
before he started making decisions and performing actions.)  
 
Figure 4. Resting Pilot Re-Engagement Ratings 
The data for effectiveness of the resting pilot’s return 
shows that, in general, the return was effective, if not 
completely effective. The assessments by the CP and FO 
were nearly identical in this regard. The crews subjectively 
felt that the rest period did not impact their effectiveness. 
These results are not really surprising. The crews were 
paired by airline so SOP differences were minimized and 
effective teaming is part of their organizational structure 
(for the airlines tested). For RCO, the experiment team 
developed and trained a ‘before rest’ crew checklist that 
defined how to prepare for the rest period and under what 
conditions the resting pilot was to be awaken. There were 
only 2 minutes when the crews were separated after the 
flying pilot requested the resting pilot to return; although 
this can be a significant duration when trying to handle a 
failure as a single pilot, it did not destroy the CRM – all 
crews, once the CP came back into their flying duties, 
started to actively communicate the situation (i.e., the FO 
briefed the CP what happened while they were sleeping) and 
the two pilots started verbally coordinating tasking that each 
would perform to address the failure and its consequences. 
Their communication and actions were not always perfect, 
but there was evidence of active CRM in all RCO 
conditions. The crews thought this was between neutral and 
completely effective.  
 
Figure 5. Resting Pilot Re-Engagement Ratings 
Objective data and PI observations found that the post-
rest briefing for RCO is very important. The test did not 
create a ‘post-rest’ crew briefing checklist, but instead, left 
it unstructured. The resting pilot does not have a shared 
experience of the event and how the resting pilot can come 
up to speed with what they missed can be invaluable. If all 
the critical elements are not briefed, the resting pilot will 
often go down the wrong path or make erroneous 
assumptions. In some cases, the data showed missing 
checklist items because the crews did not fully brief each 
other on their reengagement. For instance, in the case of the 
unreliable airspeed non-normal, if the flying crew member 
already returned the aircraft back to the cruise altitude 
before the resting pilot was engaged, the failure indications 
were no longer present. The resting pilot might not have 
been aware of any problem since all symptoms would have 
been extinguished. 
F. Perceived Safety (Post-Run) 
Perceived safety was assessed after each run using a 
seven point Likert scale with a rating of 1 being “completely 
acceptable,” a rating of 7 being “completely unacceptable,” 
and a rating of 4 being “neutral.” The data did not show any 
significant differences or trends in the rating data by the CP 
or FO. The perceived safety ratings for the pilots (collapsing 
across CP and FO) are shown in Figure 6, indicating the 
effect of crew configuration and nominal vs. non-normal 
flight conditions.  
For nominal flight conditions, the two-crew and RCO 
configurations are completely acceptable or very near so. 
Ratings of ‘unacceptable’ were given for nominal SPO. 
These data reflect the possibly precarious situation that SPO 
presents (i.e., in the event of failures, SPO means only one 
pilot on-board to handle failures) and also, that only one 
pilot is on-board to monitor operations.  
In the event of failures and non-normal conditions, 
safety is impacted but still preserved during two-crew 
operations (although some failure conditions trend toward 
unacceptable conditions, e.g., dual generator failure and 
rudder trim runaway). The perceived safety for RCO and 
SPO is unacceptable in the event of failures or non-normal 
conditions. The RCO configuration data indicates that the 
tested non-normal conditions compromised safety and, in 
general, were not acceptable. During non-normal 
operations, the SPO condition – in general – is completely 
unacceptable (although for some reasons, some pilots gave 
‘acceptable’ ratings for a few failure events.) 
 
Figure 6: Perceived Safety, Post-Run 
G. Failure Effects 
The Failure/Recovery Rating Scale [36] subjectively 
quantified two events, Effect of Failure and Ability to 
Recover, using a decision tree – with ratings from A to H – 
that reflects the pilot’s perception of the effect of the failure 
and their ability to recover, respectively. The first rating – 
“Effect of Failure” – ranged from “minimal excursions in 
aircraft state” (rating of A) to “catastrophic encounter with 
obstacles or structural failure” (rating of H). The second 
rating – “Ability to Recover” – ranged from “corrective 
control action not require” (rating of A) to “no possibility of 
averting catastrophe” (rating of H). 
The failure/recovery rating data are collapsed across 
CP/FO – they did not significantly differ in their 
assessments. In Figure 7, the data are shown for the two-
crew, RCO, and SPO crew configurations. The data indicate 
that the two-crew and RCO conditions are not significantly 
different. There is a slight trend toward worse ratings for the 
RCO, but nothing dramatically different. On the contrary, 
the SPO ratings show that even relatively minor non-
normals create notable failure effects and decrements in the 
ability of the single pilot to recover the aircraft. Ratings of 
F or worse indicate that the pilots view safety of flight as 
being compromised. SPO more often creates cases where 
this happens (Note – there are half the number of ratings for 
SPO in these figures compared to two-crew and RCO since 
there are two pilot ratings for the two-crew and RCO 
evaluations versus just one for SPO).  
 
Fig. 7, Failure/Recovery Ratings  
H. Post-Test Safety and Acceptance 
Post-test data was used to gather a perspective view from 
the flight crew of safety and acceptance for RCO and SPO:  
 The safety of flight for the RCO and SPO crew 
complement was evaluated in comparison to current-day 
two-crew operations using the color-coded, thirteen-
point Likert-type scale (Fig. 8). The scale ranges from 
“no safety effect” to “catastrophic” safety effects for 
RCO and SPO. 
 The pilots also used a seven-point Likert-type scale to 
rate the “acceptability” of RCO and SPO compared to 
two-crew operations, with a rating of 1 being 
“completely acceptable” and a rating of 7 being 
“completely unacceptable.” 
 
Fig. 8, Likert-Type Rating Scale for Safety Effect 
The perceived safety results show that RCO was rated 
across the spectrum by the pilots for safety and acceptability 
(see Figure 9 for safety; the acceptability data were 
analogous). There were no appreciable differences from the 
CPs vs. FOs. The comments reflect the wide spectrum of 
rating data - as one noted, the “time delay for crew member 
to return to his seat has some risk exposure. But not much.” 
And “as long as a secure system is in place to recall the crew 
member back in matter of max 90 sec. It would not be an 
issue.” On the other hand, many other suggested that it is 
“always better to have two sets of eyes/ brains evaluating 
from onset of situation.” The objective data showed that 
pilot monitoring is critical to error catching and trapping. 
 
Figure 9:  Perceived Safety of RCO compared to Dual Crew 
The SPO condition was clearly not well appreciated by 
the flight crew (perceived safety shown in Figure 10 and 
acceptability in Figure 11). Some of the best ratings were 
quantified, “single pilot can be conducted safely except 
certain non-normal operations could become very risky” but 
the majority of the ratings reflect the opinion that SPO is 
“dangerous; no one to share workload or responsibilities.” 
“As the system stands it would be catastrophic – would 
require vast changes to A/C and ATC system – perhaps 
impossible – no human safety net – reduces safety and 
increases risks – environment demands two person effort.” 
 
Figure 10:  Perceived Safety of SPO compared to Two- Crew  
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 Figure 11:  Perceived Acceptability of SPO compared to Two- Crew 
VI. TECHNOLOGY 
The test used current-day flight deck equipage. As such, 
there were limitations for the subjects’ assessments of RCO 
and SPO. However, these data highlighted what 
technologies are needed to support present-day two-crew 
operations and if RCO and/or SPO would ever be acceptable 
in commercial transport aircraft operations.   
A. Virtual Co-Pilot Concept 
The SPO condition experienced by the subjects did not 
include a ‘virtual co-pilot’ or specialized ground assistant. 
A virtual co-pilot would be a system/process where a 
qualified person, e.g., an appropriately trained individual 
(including but not necessarily limited to a pilot) utilized 
real-time, two-way transmission of voice and/or text and 
flight-critical data between an aircraft and a ground-based 
computer workstation, who could perform a number of 
functions that would enhance or maintain flight safety such 
as assisting in the performance of routine checklists, 
monitoring and communicating with air traffic control, 
advising the pilot in the aircraft on how to handle any in-
flight situations that may arise, and transmitting flight 
routing via Aircraft Addressing and Reporting System 
(ACARS) or similar data-link for auto-loading into the 
flight management system. 
We used a second post-test workload comparison 
assessment (using SWORD) to quantify the pilot’s 
assessment of the relative workload ratings while 
conducting descent, approach, and landing operations for 
three crew conditions: Two-Crew, SPO, and a Single Pilot 
with Virtual Co-Pilot concept. The two-crew and SPO were 
flown in the test.  
Independent ANOVA analyses revealed crew 
configuration was significant for CP SWORD ratings 
(F(2,51)=36.47, p<0.0001) and FO SWORD ratings 
(F(2,51)=31.08, p<0.0001). Post-hoc tests (SNK using 
=0.05) showed the same three unique subsets for the CP 
and FO SWORD ratings: 1) Two-Crew (lowest workload), 
2) Single Pilot with Virtual Co-Pilot, and 3) SPO (highest 
workload) while conducting descent, approach, and landing 
operations. 
The Virtual co-pilot as a concept was shown to have 
merit but flight crews noted several observations: 
 The post-test pilot assessments included Likert-type 
ratings as to whether a “virtual co-pilot concept” would 
be beneficial and/or make SPO acceptable (note SPO’s 
Unacceptable ratings in Figure 11). The data showed 
better acceptability of SPO with the Virtual Co-plot 
(Figure 12) than without (Figure 10).  But a wide 
variety of opinions were provided from “lots of 
potential … except maybe for incapacitation (or) 
complete … data transmission loss” to “for nominal 
flights, sheer boredom would put safety effect in 8-9 
range. System failure with no assistance causing 
manual flight in degraded modes would probably be 
catastrophic.” 
 In the experiment, the virtual co-pilot was not 
simulated per se, but the airline dispatch 
communications were felt by the flight crew to be a 
type of virtual co-pilot. Dispatch provided some 
support, depending upon the flight crew requests. Some 
asked for checklist support whereas others did not. 
Many thought that if the “virtual pilot doesn’t have all 
the parameters of flight available to him the single pilot 
would be spending most of his time relaying 
environmental issues.” Most flight crews during SPO 
did not use dispatch because they could not afford the 
time, workload, and communications bandwidth to try 
to get dispatch up-to-speed with the problem to the 
extent that they can be useful. 
 All flight deck functions and indications need to be 
made available and controllable by a human on the 
flight deck or via remote operation. First-and-foremost, 
remote control of all functions would be needed in the 
event of pilot incapacitation for safety and in 
compliance with regulations.  
 The remote pilot would need a direct view or 
replication of the cockpit. Many crews/pilots noted that 
if they needed to brief the remote co-pilot on what was 
happening, they would lose valuable time and 
increased their workload to the extent that it would kill 
any benefit of remote assistance. CRM and task 
coordination would need to be further explored.  
 Although some data suggests that remote pilots can 
come up to speed quickly, these data and others suggest 
that verbal and non-verbal data are important to CRM. 
Real-time video as a minimum would be necessary, but 
it is not clear that it would be sufficient. The crews 
highlighted that it must be self-evident of who is 
controlling what switch, doing what task, etc. 
 Overall, however, the pilot sentiments were that 
“nothing can replace a pilot in the cockpit” and “SPO 
has no place in (Part) 121 ops.” 
 
 
Figure 12: Acceptability of SPO with Virtual Co-Pilot  
B. Near-term 
Some technology needs were identified that can clearly 
support present-day two-crew operations. The items most 
often noted were: 
 The current-day B737-800 Engine Indication and Crew 
Alerting System (EICAS) and QRH provide awareness 
of failures and methods to maintain safety-of-flight. 
However, in many cases flown here, electrical and air 
system synoptic pages would significantly aid the flight 
crew in identifying critical items and function elements 
that had failed. The current processes do not articulate 
or annunciate the root cause nor the systems and 
capabilities that are impacted, degraded, or inoperative. 
Current-day methods rely on the knowledge and skill 
of the crew to be able to absorb the Caution, Alerting, 
Warning System (CAWS) data and identify the root-
cause. Pilots follow the QRH to ‘safe’ the system but 
the current-day SOPs are reactive and significantly 
relies on expert users (pilots) to stay ahead of situations. 
 The current-day CAWS does not often identify what 
can’t be done operationally after the failure. These data 
should be explicit and not subject to the crew’s 
initiative to dig though the QRH or rely on their 
experience and expertise [37]. There are now some 
failures that are annunciated as to what functions are no 
longer available (e.g., “NO AUTOLAND”) but in this 
test, operations that are not authorized were flown 
either because the crew didn’t have the time, or didn’t 
know that they should dig through the QRH to find the 
limitations after some failures.  
 The crew often cited that they would like automatic, 
interactive electronic checklists (prioritized from most 
critical to least) to attend to the failures with speech 
recognition interfaces to trigger actions. 
 The dual generator failure highlighted the need for 60 
minute batteries or a Ram-Air Turbine (RAT) electrical 
source. Today, some airlines equip the B737-800 with 
only 30 minutes of batteries. Our data suggests that this 
may not be enough time during adverse weather and 
remote flight locations.  
 The crews were very efficient at donning and 
configuring oxygen masks but valuable time was lost. 
This was one of the items often load-shed by the crews 
(i.e., in their assessment, hypoxia was not going to be a 
significant concern and they needed the time to attend 
to other, more critical duties). Automated methods for 
intercom integration into the oxygen masks would save 
valuable seconds.  
 In augmented crew flying, scripted briefings/checklists 
for ‘before rest’ and ‘after rest’ should be mandated to 
ensure situation awareness and good CRM upon return-
to-duties. 
 The possibility of single pilot operations must always 
be considered a possibility within the current two-crew 
complement due to pilot incapacitation. The SPO data 
showed that if the QRH is moved to an Electronic 
Flight Bag, in addition to charts that already have 
migrated there, problems will ensue. The single pilot 
could not easily or effectively use one device for two 
critical functions. Approval of electronic QRH should 
be evaluated for this possibility.  
C. Future 
The viability of RCO and SPO are predicated, as a 
minimum, on developing IAS for the following tasks:  
 First and foremost, SPO and even RCO cannot happen 
without effective and reliable monitoring of the pilot 
flying for possible impairment and incapacitation.  
 SPO and RCO requires IAS to perform various 
functions on the flight deck, first-and-foremost being a 
pilot-monitoring function. The experiment objective 
data shows that two sets of eyes are better than one. 
Monitoring of the flight is critical, including decisions, 
switch actions, and flight path. 
 RCO as a concept has benefit if the incapacitation and 
impairment challenge can be met and if effective rest 
can be obtained, without sleep inertia impacts, to 
combat fatigue. In our experiment, we had one instance 
where a pilot responded that he actually fell asleep, 
without detrimental impact in performance.  
 The present-day automation design paradigm is not 
sufficient for SPO/RCO. Current-day automation is 
strong, silent, and yet brittle. It forces the pilot into the 
pilot-monitoring role for which the human is not ideally 
suited, especially if they are the only human on the 
flight deck. This role would make a difficult task much 
worse. Autonomy, as opposed to automation, should be 
robust, responsive to a delegation of tasks and goals 
from the pilot, and adaptive and adaptable to the needs 
of the human. Autonomy must effectively team with 
the human to keep them in the loop and situation aware. 
The communication modalities that pilots use today on 
the flight deck - natural language, gesture, posture, eye 
gaze, etc. – must be inherent to the autonomy interface 
for effective communication.  
 The next level for crew state monitoring – above and 
beyond impairment and incapacitation monitoring and 
detection - is bi-directional communication with 
autonomous systems. Bi-directional communication is 
an essential element for good teaming, including 
human-autonomy teaming. The team work 
demonstrated during RCO and two-crew operations 
was critical to mission success. These teaming 
principles must be replicated with autonomy.  
 A critical element of autonomy support would be 
monitoring of decisions. Previous work in decision-
support aids has shown tendencies toward automation 
bias; a different approach such as the “curious partner” 
[38] might alleviate confirmation bias. The “curious 
partner” approach would place the human in the 
‘proper’ role for maintaining SA and expertise, while 
using the oversight by an autonomous agent to create 
error checking and trapping. Decision-making support 
would also need to expand to higher levels of 
abstraction, answering questions such as “should I?” 
instead of the question usually answered today: “Can 
I?” 
The development of future technology directions based 
on this research should not be considered all inclusive; other 
works, such as [39], highlight some similar, yet different 
perspectives. Additional research and development will be 
required, in addition to significant regulatory and societal 
change, for RCO or SPO to ever become a reality.  
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
This experiment evaluated the human pilot contribution 
to flight safety. Crew complement was experimentally 
changed to RCO or SPO from the nominal two-crew in an 
assessment of the level of the safety and performance in 
today’s airspace with today’s cockpit design.  
The data supports the criticality of the human’s role and 
the adaptability of human pilots/flight crew that is 
instrumental in overcoming non-normal conditions and in 
completing safe recoveries, even in SPO. The pilots were 
able to workload-shed tasks and duties, enlist help from 
ATC or their airline dispatch center, and perform actions 
and make the proper decisions in enough time to safely 
complete the flight within acceptable flight performance 
limits. The data also indicate, however, that single pilot 
operations are not nominally acceptable due to the 
significant task demands and workload. The pilots could 
overcome the circumstances presented, but rated the 
workload, safety, and acceptability as being unacceptable in 
an emergency situation. There were notable flight 
performance decrements during SPO compared to two-crew 
operations that suggest unacceptable, reduced safety 
margins. 
Present-day attitudes from the participants were not 
entirely negative toward RCO. The value of RCO 
operations was seen to combat fatigue. However, there are 
identified technology and regulatory hurdles for RCO, in 
particular, the inertia due to sleep or rest for the resting pilot 
in terms of how quickly and effectively they can come back 
to full effectiveness. The resting pilot noted these 
deficiencies more so than the pilot-flying. In addition, pilot 
monitoring of the pilot flying for incapacitation and 
impairment would be critical as well as monitoring of the 
actions of the pilot flying.  
Autonomy to enable RCO and SPO is required; but 
“more automation” analogous to present-day autoflight 
systems was not advocated. New technologies – 
increasingly autonomous systems – with new 
functionalities, responsibilities, effective human-autonomy 
teaming, using natural language and gestures for example, 
and robustness are needed.  
It is felt by some that “the greatest obstacle to the 
development of a civil, single pilot aircraft is not the 
technology per se but applying the technology and 
developing the automation and user interfaces.” These data 
suggest that while it may be true that new technologies are 
not needed, we don’t have the knowledge to effectively 
employ these technologies, nor to create the functionality 
that would be required with the requisite reliability and 
robustness, as well as the adaptability and predictability to 
safety implement SPO and RCO today. Additional research 
and development is necessary. 
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